Mainstream media remain silent while the Bundestag approves the Europeanisation of the German redundancy fund

"If the Italians, who are on average richer, allow themselves a poor state, it is perfectly legitimate and it is their right, but they are not entitled to receive benefits that they have not financed. And the Germans, who are poorer, and can afford a richer state, are not obliged to pay twice", writes the great German intellectual and publicist Klaus-Rüdiger Mai in reference to the recent approval by the Bundestag of the law for the financing of the SURE, the plan for a European integration fund. For Klaus-Rüdiger Mai the silence of the mainstream media on the subject is very serious and is a sign of complicity. Klaus-Ruediger Mai from Tichys Einblick.

Although little has so far been said in the media, between Wednesday and Thursday the way was paved for the Europeanisation of the German unemployment insurance system. The crisis caused by the Coronavirus will be used as a pretext to deprive German taxpayers and workers covered by social insurance of their rights, to remove powers from the Bundestag and to overcome the final obstacles to funding states along the road to pooling debts.

Already approved by the Bundesrat, Wednesday in the Bundestag there was the first reading of the SURE Guarantee Act, after which the draft will pass to the committees. However, we do not expect a more in-depth and responsible discussion by the members of the committees, as the second and third readings and the passing of the bill have already been scheduled for Friday. In line with the major transformation announced by Angela Merkel at the World Economic Forum in Davos, this law represents a massive entry into the sphere of the fundamental rights of workers, their social security and that of their families.

The SURE guarantee law allows the EU to borrow up to EUR 100 billion on the financial markets to pay the redundancy fund in the different Member States. These funds will have to be distributed to certain EU Member States in the form of loans. The law does not specify the conditions under which these "loans" will be "granted", but stipulates that an EU guarantee of €25 billion is required for the issuance of the debt. A quarter of the guarantees will come from Germany for a value of around EUR 6.4 billion.

"This Act authorises the Federal Government to issue the relevant guarantee". Fully in Merkel's style, point C reads: "Alternatives: None". In addition, the law does not contain any regulations in the case of a very likely default in the repayment of the loans, the conditions of which are not even mentioned; finally, the German Government considers that 'the use by the Federal Republic of Germany of the guarantees issued is unlikely'. If the Federal Government had wanted to fulfil its obligation to avoid harm to citizens, it would at least have made an effort to take into account the level of the national debt of the States benefiting from the 'loans' which will be financed to a considerable extent by the Germans. Imagine a banker granting a loan to an already heavily indebted customer, which then goes on to burden the account of another customer, who instead has a better credit rating because the customer has been more thrifty.

In the text of the approved law, the government argues that no new financial commitments will be introduced for citizens, that there will be no additional costs to the economy, including small and medium-sized enterprises, and that no effect on price levels should be expected. The government of good weather, in any case, does not expect bad news.

It is not a good sign for the state of democracy if politicians do not even notice the euphemism "the finances of the European Union". After all, the debt is mainly financed by the taxpayers of the European Union countries who pay taxes. But what can you ever expect if even a leader of the SPD with his parliamentary allowance thinks he is supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, as if it is not the small and medium-sized enterprises that pay most of the taxes thanks to which Saskia Esken can live so comfortably.

The question then arises as to why the redundancy fund should be financed by the EU, since the allowance itself is not linked to the economic performance of the state and has nothing to do with the crisis caused by the Coronavirus. The unemployment benefit is an insurance benefit created to prevent unemployment in economic crises and to help workers and employers overcome the crisis.

In Germany, the Kurzarbeitergeld was introduced on 1 January 1957 by Article II of the Law amending and supplementing the Employment and Unemployment Insurance Act of 23 December 1956. Paragraph 130 states clearly there: 'The unemployment benefit is granted to employees subject to compulsory insurance through the social security funds for unemployment insurance in the private sector'. The German short-time working allowance is therefore not paid from the EU budget, nor from EU loans, nor from German tax revenue, but is part of the German unemployment insurance scheme, in which German employees and employers pay their contributions and is one of the largest social security contributions. If Italians, who are on average richer, allow themselves a poorer state, it is perfectly legitimate and it is their right, but they are not entitled to receive benefits that they have not financed. And the Germans, who are poorer, and can afford a richer state, are not obliged to pay twice. Italy, then, already has something similar to the instrument of the German Kurzarbeitergeld (unemployment insurance fund).

The law on guarantees for the European fund SURE will introduce a European allowance for part-time work based not on the principle of insurance, but on credit: loans that are basically already guaranteed by those who pay taxes and social security contributions that are already too high in themselves, and to whom the policy of zero interest rates aimed at financing the states, is in fact devaluing savings.

The introduction of the European unemployment benefit will act as a bridge to the launch of a European unemployment insurance scheme, which will eventually Europeanise the German unemployment insurance scheme. The level of German unemployment insurance benefits will therefore fall, despite the increase in contributions paid. The objective remains, however, to introduce a European unemployment insurance scheme, as the situation is currently favourable in order to deceive German citizens, by means of rapid legislation, who no longer even want to call it a procedure, on the pretext of solidarity and the crisis caused by the Coronavirus. The government can finally count on the complicity of a large part of the media to keep quiet about these and other projects.

The states that will be generously encouraged with these loans will also not even be obliged to spend the money exclusively on lay-off funds, but will be able to use it for "comparable measures and support measures for the health sector, especially for the protection of health in the workplace". And because, as we all know, it is all connected, there will be no limit to the imagination when it comes to how this EUR 100 billion can be spent. If you then consider that Ursula von der Leyen is already talking about spending billions of euros, you get the impression that Brussels has lost touch with reality and probably also lost track of what is happening. There are already EUR 750 billion on the table for some kind of bond, an increase in the EU budget, which will increase the German contribution by another paltry 43%, and here we have a loan to finance a European integration fund.

The only thing that is certain is that a new big party has already started and the financial industry is already in the mood to celebrate - because German taxpayers' money is already certain for them. The EU is working on the biggest redistribution programme in the history of mankind. And it reserves the right to set the rules.

According to the chronicles, however, the draft in the CDU/CSU parliamentary group remains controversial. Perhaps a miracle will happen in the end, and there will be enough MEPs ready to defend the interests of those who elected them to represent them.

Heiner Flassbeck - Europe cannot afford another season of wage moderation in Germany

"If the German economy tried once again to squeeze its European trading partners with wage cuts, this attempt would turn into suicide. Not only would it cause enormous damage to German domestic demand, but it would also stifle European partners forever, who are desperately fighting for their economic survival," writes the great German economist Heiner Flassbeck. A very interesting reflection on the great challenges that the German government will have to face in the coming months; the hope is that unlike in 2008 they have learned their lesson and this time they are not working exclusively in the German interest. An excellent Heiner Flassbeck from Makroskop.de

Everyone would like to go back to normal - even economically. Most people, however, still do not want to admit it: pre-crisis normality will never return. The post-crisis economy will no longer be the economy we knew before. The situation has developed in a very different way from how politicians and probably also virologists and epidemiologists had imagined it. Operation Great Festivities, after which in three or four months the world would simply have to return to its old life, failed dramatically.

We do not want to talk again about the reasons for the failure. What matters now is that we do not make new serious mistakes that could damage economic development in the decades to come, both in Germany and in Europe.

A model is already emerging that leads us towards completely wrong decisions. Just as happened after the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the coalition partners in Berlin are overwhelmed by panic and fear. After they had managed to successfully combat the financial crisis at the time thanks to public debt, they immediately chose instead to include a balanced budget in the Constitution and so the Schwarze Null objective was pursued for years - to the detriment not only of the German economy, but also of the partners in the monetary union.

The debt relief mechanism set up at the time is already casting its shadow over the current crisis management. And the second major issue, which will be equally decisive in determining the long-term economic damage that the crisis caused by the Coronavirus will produce in Germany and Europe - the wage agreements for the next 12-24 months - already seems to be moving in a fatal direction.

Repaying the public debt quickly?

The CDU is already raising the first voices calling for a tight deadline for repaying the public debt. Paul Ziemiak, Secretary General of the UNHRC, is already talking about a maximum of ten years in which all public debts, which have been added in the meantime, will have to be repaid in full. He justifies this request by saying that the policy of the Schwarze Null would bear fruit during the current crisis, since Germany at this stage would have "earned" a margin of manoeuvre "for which other states today envy us".

The macroeconomic nonsense that emerges from these words undoubtedly fits in perfectly with the expectations of potential CDU voters, which makes this position understandable from a political and partisan point of view. Unfortunately, this does not change the total lack of macroeconomic logic. Throughout the coalition government, in fact, there is talk of reducing debt as if it is only a matter of political will whether or not it can be done.

But this is by no means the case. It is simply impossible for the state to expect a growing economy, which is essential to bring the budget deficit to zero and repay the public debt, at a time when the industrial sector is very thrifty. It is time to take note of the situation: there is no longer a business sector that invests so much that it has to go into debt.

In Europe as a whole, it will be very difficult to reduce public budget deficits or even repay old debts. Families and individuals have traditionally saved money, and the business sector has been doing the same for about 20 years. Saving, however, must be accompanied by debt if the economy is not to decline at the same time. Anyone who ignores this simple macro-economic logic and tries to adopt economic policy measures that explicitly violate this logic will achieve the opposite of what is hoped for: it will cause the crisis to worsen and prolong at the expense of large sections of the European population.

Which sectors in Europe can still get into debt to rebalance the private sector's willingness to save? There are only national public budgets and countries outside Europe. But the latter will never allow Europe to have such high current account surpluses with the rest of the world that, on the one hand, the national public budgets of the European countries will no longer have to record deficits parallel to the willingness of the private sector to save and, on the other, they will never allow Europeans to make such large surpluses that they can reduce the old public debts made in the days of the coronavirus. Before that happens, we would have a trade war between Europe and the rest of the world or a race for devaluation between the euro and non-European currencies (which is practically the same thing). Both scenarios would lead the world even deeper into a serious economic crisis.

And this applies not only to Europe as a whole, but also and above all to Germany as a single country. In a completely different way from what Paul Ziemiak's quote at the beginning of the article suggests, a country has only one way to save all three domestic sectors without the economy collapsing: to push foreign countries into the role of debtors. And it can only do so through a systematic reduction in prices on international markets, which can in no way be offset by currency appreciation.

In other words: Germany should repeat its current account surplus strategy of the last twenty years at the expense of its partners in the monetary union. But it will no longer be able to do so, because the economies of its monetary union partners are now on their knees. The first professional and realistic forecast available for the first half of 2020, presented last week by the DIW, assumes that the German current account surplus this year will fall to €80 billion (after more than 200 billion in 2019).

Unless it wants a total destruction of Europe, Germany will have no chance to return to the old situation of a high current account surplus. If the German economy were to try once again to squeeze its European trading partners with wage cuts, this would turn into suicide. Not only would this do enormous damage to German domestic demand, but it would also stifle European trading partners forever, who are desperately fighting for their economic survival.

Wage moderation is suicide

But it is precisely this suicidal variant that is already manifesting itself - in addition to the politicians' desire to reduce the public deficit immediately and even to turn it into a surplus to be used to reduce the debt. Not only the German trade unions are hearing nothing, apart from the demand for employment levels to be guaranteed. Rather, there are already sectors in which there is open talk of workers giving up part of their wages in exchange for guarantees that employers would maintain employment levels. The case of Lufthansa is of course exemplary: the pilots have proposed temporarily giving up 45 % of their salary to help the airline overcome the crisis.

There is no doubt that Lufthansa pilots are a special case: they earn very high salaries (which makes a partial waiver easier), have undergone very expensive training (reflected in their salary level), are highly specialised and therefore have little chance of finding an equivalent alternative to their current profession in Germany. In this situation the renunciation of a part of the salary is reasonable because from the point of view of microeconomic rationality it is the only possibility they have to save their job and avoid a social collapse.

This applies to a much lesser extent to Lufthansa cabin crew. They receive lower salaries, they are not so highly skilled and it is therefore easier to redeploy them elsewhere. For them, even if they are laid off, but the economy as a whole gets back on its feet, the collapse is much less dramatic because they have a much better chance of being able to change sector without suffering huge losses of income.

However, even the enormous renunciation of pilots will not be able to save all their jobs if commercial flights were to be replaced on a large scale by videoconferencing and other possibilities for virtual communication and cooperation.

Perhaps the shock caused by the coronavirus was not the real cause of the crisis in the aviation sector, but it could turn into the trigger and accelerator of a profound structural change in the globalised economy, which cannot be stopped by the sacrifice of part of the salary.

But one thing must be absolutely clear: for employees as a whole, salary reduction is not a temporary game as in the case of pilots, but an instalment suicide. The eloquent silence of the trade unions, however, raises the suspicion that this is exactly what will happen. The wage renunciation, i.e. the renunciation by the workers of a wage increase of about 3% for the next 3 years, will lead in the short and medium term to a weakening of economic growth and thus to the destruction of many jobs, and in the long term to deflation.

What are the German unions up to? The graph shows that collective agreements over the last ten years have come very close to the inflation target of 1.9 %, i.e. actual real wages have increased only slightly or not at all. Anyone intending to fall below this level or not to increase wages at all creates competitive pressure on the whole of Europe, and this pressure will inevitably turn into deflation at European level.

What would seem to be an exchange at company level between 'wage concessions in exchange for job security', is in fact at macroeconomic level a programme to destroy jobs. And this means that, despite the crisis and the general weakness of the economy, every effort must be made to keep collective wage increases at a minimum of 3%.

To make it clear once again: this is not a left-wing or right-wing policy shift, there is no regulatory wish list on what could be improved in terms of social policy. No, this is about the naked economy, i.e. the macro-economy, which, in order to be able to protect everyone - from the less well-off to the well-off - must be defended from the risk of being crushed on the wall of ideological madness.

What's a state to do?

It is the state that is directly responsible for the fact that the security of employment levels has become the most important thing for trade unions today. Because of the Hartz legislation, introduced by the Red-Green coalition at the beginning of this century, the economic decline, and therefore also in terms of social status, of a normal worker who becomes unemployed is enormous. After just one year of unemployment, in fact, he ends up at the level of the poorest in society, namely in Hartz IV.

If this is not (yet) the case, because he may have previously accumulated some wealth thanks to the efforts made to save, or for example if he managed to repay part or all of the mortgage on his property, he will have to use some of this wealth (on the asset limits for Hartz IV benefits, see here) before the state can help him with basic security. And this has always been questionable from the point of view of social justice. Considering that overcoming the crisis caused by the coronavirus should instead concern the stabilization of expectations, the calculation of available assets in the case of Hartz IV beneficiaries will be a major obstacle.

Among other things, this also and especially applies to the self-employed and freelancers affected by the crisis, who do not have any entitlement to unemployment benefit and are therefore completely dependent on Hartz IV for their direct livelihood (apart from some regional programmes that have tried to help them with benefits). Although the asset test has been suspended until 30 June 2020, the probability that the self-employed affected by the crisis, already in the second half of the year, will be even partially in conditions similar to those before the lockdown, is very low. This means that, before they can continue to receive basic assistance from July, they will have to use the few savings they have accumulated. Expectations for the future of this group of people should therefore be far from positive.

The collapse in the social status of the long-term unemployed, as provided for by the state through Hartz legislation, has led to a significant drop in the willingness of trade unions to strike in favour of reasonable wage agreements. The risk of losing their social status when they lose their jobs is so great that any threat from employers to close production facilities and relocate production is taken seriously, thus prompting trade unions to make concessions in wage negotiations. This legislation, which is explicitly based on the idea that the unemployed should be encouraged to do more to find an existing job, was already more than questionable when it was introduced. Today it is much more dangerous.

If, on the other hand, the state leaves the current legal framework for unemployment insurance and basic security unchanged and focuses only on preserving old structures on the capital side (e.g. Lufthansa), or on promoting investment in new, more environmentally friendly structures, it will not be possible to escape the accusation that it wants to put the interests of investors above those of workers. The belief that all wealth in the long term comes mainly from companies was already questionable at a time when the corporate sector was still getting into debt, and therefore took on the macroeconomic task that one would expect from this sector. Today that is clearly wrong.

Cannon meat for large slaughterhouses

Working conditions in many German slaughterhouses are disastrous, housing is overcrowded and cramped, and workers from the East must also suffer the usual racism of their landlords. The wave of contagion from Covid-19 finally brings to light a system of industrial exploitation that desperately needs cannon fodder from all over Europe to move forward. A very interesting article from the Süddeutsche Zeitung explains to us how the Tonnies system works

A few minutes later the first Whatsapp message arrives from a man we call Marius Popescu*. The SZ asked on a Facebook group of Romanians from North Rhine-Westphalia if anyone wanted to talk about working conditions in the slaughtering industry. Since 2015, Popescu has always worked for Tönnies, until about three weeks ago he was placed in quarantine. The large meat processing factory has now ended up in the centre of attention, after more than 1,000 workers tested positive at Covid-19.

Popescu speaks calmly and quietly. It's not that everything in the meat industry sucks so much, he says. But much of what he tells us also explains why there is hardly anyone willing to work in slaughterhouses anymore.

Popescu started by packing meat for Tonnies, then moved on to cutting. He tells us about 200 hours of work per month and housing where before the pandemic three to seven people shared a room. But he doesn't seem particularly shocked about it. "Sure, the work is hard." Popescu was in the army, but he doesn't remember it being that hard. He worked maybe a tenth as hard as he does now at Tönnies. At first he didn't think he could do it - industrial slaughter seemed too brutal to him. He sees his work at Tönnies as a possible springboard for something better. Thanks to this work he would like to find something else to do in Germany, possibly in another sector.

Popescu seems to be really amazed at just one subject. About six weeks ago, in fact, he and his wife had already been tested for the Coronavius. Afterwards they even went back to work. But only two weeks later he was told of the results: Popescu's wife was positive. He could not understand why it took so long for the analysis. Nor can he understand why there were no further tests or any information after that. The next day he, his wife and the entire shift were sent into quarantine. Since then, no one has contacted him. Other workers also reported to the SZ that there had been individual cases of coronavirus in Tönnies for some time.

"Those who complained were thrown out."

After Marius Popescu, other workers wanted to talk to the SZ, most of them upset. Andrei Amariei* writes that he would like to warn people against the typical exploitation of slaughterhouses like Tönnies. Amariei meanwhile has left the sector. From 2015 to 2019 he packed meat in Germany, mostly from Tönnies to Rheda-Wiedenbrück. Now he lives in Romania again and is happy, he tells this in a phone call on Facetime. The list of his accusations against Tönnies is long. At first they made him work for seven weeks without a day off - and always at night, because he urgently needed money. But the other workers often got one day off every three weeks as well. Even his employer, as in the case of Marius Popescu, an intermediary subcontractor, was cheating on wages. When Amariei left the company housing, the subcontractor still deducted his rent. If they spent time cleaning the workplace, it wasn't considered working time. Amariei also reported "errors" in his pay slip, always in favour of the employer. Regularly hours were missing, even though the actual working hours were recorded with fingerprint scans at the time of entry. "Those who complained were no longer considered necessary," says Amariei. He answered the questions with an embarrassed smile, as if he himself was surprised to be trapped in such a system. He calls Tönnies a "state within a state". Even Chancellor Merkel wouldn't be able to get in, if there wasn't someone to get her through. In fact, he is not allowed to report anything about working conditions at Tönnies, it is written in the employment contract with his subcontractor.

Until the publication of this article, Tönnies did not respond to the SZ's requests.

The descriptions of Popescu and Amariei coincide with other information, such as that of Szabolcs Sepsi. Since 2013, he has been responsible for the "Faire Mobilität" project in Dortmund in which he helps workers to defend their rights.

Sepsi explains how the meat sector, some 30 years ago, was industrialised and liberalised. "There is a tough price war being waged by competing subcontractors." The meat industry has taken the system of works contracts to extremes. Many workers could be transferred at any time. According to his estimates, of Toennies' 7,000 employees currently in quarantine, about 3,500 work for external companies, about 2,000 are Romanian. Without this confusing system of subcontractors, Tönnies could have more easily identified the workers' housing, Sepsi says.

No doubt the situation in housing has improved in recent years. In the past he happened to find mold, cockroaches and open electric cables. Like Popescu, Sepsi says that the slaughterhouse should only be a springboard for finding better jobs in Germany. But he also says: "The living conditions in the housing remain difficult.  As many meat processing plants work 24 hours a day, the queue often forms in front of the toilets and you can no longer stay in peace and quiet. And this could also fuel conflicts with the neighborhood: "When the van picks up the workers at night and honks the horn, I think it's very annoying. Sepsi confirms that wage fraud is systematic in this area. Most workers officially earn the minimum wage, but they have to work more than agreed. Over the years, some develop chronic pain and are sometimes "taken out" by subcontractors.

People currently in quarantine are particularly outraged by the claim that they were going away for a long weekend and so they would take the virus with them when they returned. In fact, many people were working in the plants: "There was no long weekend for the meat industry," Sepsi says. "The claim is simply false and only fuels racism."

Tönnies' employees would have been refused entry to the medical clinics.

There is already an increase in marginalisation: he has been told that medical clinics no longer allow employees in Tönnies. It is said that supermarkets have let people out who they thought were Romanians. "It happened to Cosfeld too," Sepsi says.

For Andrei Amariei it's no big surprise. He says: 'Romanians have always been at the bottom of the social ladder, even Poles and Turks look down on us. He tells of a Romanian acquaintance who, as a supermarket clerk, was forbidden to speak Romanian to Romanian customers. On the one hand, he remembers the nice neighbours - and on the other hand, he remembers all those who never missed an opportunity to complain about the Romanians. "Even though a car was parked a little crooked." Amariei is also very annoyed by the statements of NRW President Armin Laschet. Last Wednesday, in fact, they asked Laschet what the Toennies contagion boom meant in terms of loosening the bans. Laschet replied: "He tells us nothing about it, because the Romanians and Bulgarians have returned to Germany and the virus is coming from their countries. Later, Laschet also cited housing as a possible cause of spread, but after the very heavy criticism he received, he had to make it clear: "It is not possible to blame the virus on people of whatever origin they are".

Amariei instead argues that Toennies, like Laschet, was just trying to shift the blame onto someone who can be replaced more easily: "You will always find someone who is willing to work hard in the end, even for little money. The people who put the money in their pockets are now simply blaming them. There is no decency in all this".

* The names of the employees have been changed.

Heiner Flassbeck - Why the 130 billion of the German government will not be enough

Will the 130 billion euros promised by the Berlin government be enough to keep the German economy going? For the great German economist Heiner Flassbeck it is not enough at all, because the current economic crisis, clearly visible in the recent Kurzarbeit boom, is on a scale never seen before and largely underestimated by the Berlin government. Recent data on exports then show a historical collapse in foreign demand, which is essential to keep afloat a production system based on wage moderation. In the end it will be the workers who will pay the bill for this export-oriented production model as usual: first in redundancy, then in unemployment and finally in Hartz IV. A very interesting analysis by Heiner Flassbeck and Friedericke Spiecker from Makroskop.de

Since the beginning of the coronavirus crisis we have stressed (see the article of 21 March) that this shock caused by governments should not be compared to a recession or a normal economic slowdown. This shock is much bigger and more complex than anything else we have seen so far. Looking only at German industry, comparisons can be made with the great global recession of 2008/2009 (Figure 1). Although demand measured in terms of new orders fell at a much faster pace than then, the scale of the crisis is still similar. Overall, new orders (orange line) fell to a level slightly below the level of that period.

However, this only applies to the average of the sectors. For the automotive industry, for example, the current shock is much worse (Figure 2). Production in April fell by more than 70% compared to March this year, well below the lowest level in 2008/2009. The leading German industry of the last ten years is now in an existential crisis because neither at home nor abroad, due to consumer uncertainty, the purchase of a new car is currently the order of the day. 

The fact that total German exports in April also fell by almost 25% compared to the first quarter is probably largely due to the fundamental weakness in demand for cars. But mechanics is also experiencing an historic slump; since the beginning of the year, demand has fallen by a third.

The labour market is the best indicator

But that's not all. Unlike the 2008/2009 financial crisis, this time many more branches of the economy as a whole were affected, because the closure largely affected sectors which, like hotels and restaurants, normally hardly ever felt the setbacks of the economy. The construction sector, which was not directly affected by the restrictive measures in Germany and which had performed well until March, also saw a significant drop in demand in April, which will also be reflected in a significant drop in construction in the coming months.

The true extent of the crisis can only be understood by looking at the labour market. The latest data from the Federal Employment Agency (BA) on the redundancy fund (Kurzarbeit) show the real extent of the dramatic economic crisis that began with the introduction of restrictive measures to combat the coronavirus pandemic. Since March, the number of companies that have applied for the layoff fund and whose applications have been examined by the Federal Statistical Office has reached an order of magnitude that has nothing in common with the financial crisis of 2008/2009 (see the blue line in Figure 3):

After the dramatic 625,000 requests in April, even with the 67,000 in May we are still well above double the maximum figure ever reached in 2009 (at that time just under 25,000). The last figure reported for the month of May will probably be corrected upwards again, as was the case with the March and April figures. The figure currently reported for April, for example, is 37,462 higher than the preliminary figure at the end of April. BA writes about this in the explanation of the relevant statistics:

"It is possible that, at a time of increasing volumes, applications for redundancy payments may have already been received en masse by the relevant agents but have not yet been recorded electronically in the BA's specialist procedures, and this recording may only take place after a certain period of time. At present, notifications relating to the BA's specific procedures are probably underrepresented to a not inconsiderable extent'.

BA resumed its data extrapolation, which had in the meantime been discontinued, with an extended procedure to determine from the number of requests flagged and checked the actual number of firms in layoffs. This extrapolation serves as a guide during a five-month period during which the settlement of the redundancy payment has not yet been completed and the data on part-time work (Kurzarbeit) are not yet finalised.

For March, the last month for which extrapolation is currently available, the calculated figure (just under 220,000 holdings) differs by one third from the number of officially reported and controlled holdings (just under 164,000). This suggests that extrapolating the April data for the number of companies claiming to work part-time, compared to the number of companies actually working part-time, will be even worse. After all, the number of companies claiming to work part-time from March to April has almost quadrupled. The sharp drop in the number of applications in May, however, indicates that the situation, at least for new applications, is stabilising.

What about the number of people working part-time? The traffic jam caused by the unusually high number of applications in March and April had led BA to estimate the number of people laid off in March and April at 10,1 million (see BA press release of 30 April). In the meantime the processing of applications has progressed and for both months the result was a shortfall of 10,6 million (2,6 million in March and 8,0 million in April). In May, the number of (new) short-time workers is provisionally estimated at 1.06 million (see Figure 4).

Of the approximately 2,6 million people indicated as part-time workers for March, BA calculated an actual number of part-time workers of approximately 2,0 million. That is 77%. Applying the same rate to registered persons would result in more than 6 million part-time workers (short-time workers) in April alone. Together with the number accumulated in March, which probably did not decrease in April, we arrive at an estimate of the total number of redundant workers (Kurzarbeit) of about 8 million.

The Ifo Institute estimates the number of people actually laid off in May at 7.3 million. If it is assumed that in June, thanks to the relaxation of anti-coronavirus measures, the situation will improve, taking an optimistic sample calculation, it can be assumed that the number of part-time workers at the end of June is half that of May, i.e. 3.65 million. This would result in an average of around 6.3 million part-time workers in the second quarter.

Even assuming that the number of new part-time workers in June is zero, this would still result in an average of over 5 million part-time workers in the second quarter. Even in this extremely positive, if not unrealistic estimate, we are still a long way from the 2.4 million assumed in the joint diagnosis of economic research institutes. Of course, the question of the number of hours worked less is still completely open, or will actually be worked.

It is obvious, however, that the scale of the economic collapse behind these figures far outweighs the financial crisis. The common forecast estimated a drop of almost 10 % compared to the first quarter. If this is consistent with the estimated number of part-time workers, a realistic view of the redundancy fund should assume that the fall is at least twice as large.

Against this background, gross domestic product will fall by much more than expected in 2020, a number which is still under discussion. In the meantime, the Council of Economic Wise Men has already moved to an estimate of - 6.5% of GDP, after having indicated - 2.8% in its March Special Report (most likely scenario), and even in the most pessimistic scenario had remained well above the figure considered probable today.

It is extremely important to have a reasonably realistic picture of the current and projected situation in the immediate future in order to advise policy makers in a reasonable way on the nature and scope of the support measures. So far, professional predictors have not yet been able to do so. And this is one of the reasons why politics has always lagged behind, instead of taking a step forward.

The political consequences of underestimation

In the meantime, the federal government has presented a "stimulus package for the economy", the size of which (€130 billion) is generally regarded as significant and sufficient. There is a risk, however, that the usual model of politicians forced to chase events will be repeated, after underestimating the scale of the economic collapse at first. The government coalition has adopted a large number of economic measures, and it is by no means clear how and when they will enter into force. The only far-reaching measure seems to be a three-point six-month reduction in VAT.

But even this measure is still not very impressive from a quantitative point of view, at least when one considers how large the reduction in demand by households is. If the average household savings rate increases by one percentage point from 11% to 12% (in Q1 2020 the rate rose to 12.4% compared to 11.1% in Q4 2019), there will be about €10 billion less per half year in terms of consumption (total household disposable income in 2019 was €2.4 trillion, i.e. €1.2 trillion per half year, an increase in savings of one percentage point equals €12 billion more).

The loss of income due to the redundancy fund and unemployment will amount to around EUR 5 billion in the second quarter of 2020 (taking into account the redundancy fund allowance). The average net salary per employee in 2019 was EUR 24,951. Assuming that people affected by short-time working measures and unemployment tend to earn less (only €20,000 net salary per year) and that they work only 50% of the time (loss of working hours due to the redundancy fund), these households will have lost about €2,500 net, without calculating the redundancy benefit. If about 70% of the losses are offset by the Kurzarbeit allowance (60% for employees without children, 67% for employees with children; plus partial increases through collective agreements), there remains a per capita loss of income of about €750 net in the three months of the 2nd quarter.

With about 6.5 million people affected (number of redundancies in Q2 + 0.5 million more unemployed), this should translate into a loss of income in Q2 of almost €5 billion. If, with some optimism, we assume that the income losses due to part-time work and unemployment in the third and fourth quarters will be half of those in the second quarter (partly because the closure measures have been lifted, partly because the short-time work allowance has been increased to 80-87%), there will be a total of a further EUR 5 billion in income losses. This translates into about EUR 10 billion less disposable income and another EUR 10 billion due to further likely savings.

The government estimates that the relief for households resulting from the VAT reduction will be around EUR 20 billion if the VAT cut is passed on in full to consumers. This means that the relief due to the VAT reduction would, at best (i.e. in a very optimistic picture), offset the estimated fall in private consumption. It is also foreseeable that the positive effect of this measure in the last six months of this year, on the other hand, could lead to a new uncertainty in the first half of 2021 due to a fall in consumption (after the towing effects for 2020, and due to a return of VAT to the old rate as from 2021).

The fall in demand from investment is also clearly having a negative impact on the development of the economy. This is unlikely to be offset by the measures announced, as capacity utilisation is catastrophically low. Moreover, as already noted at the outset, demand from abroad, which is very important for Germany, is falling without any possibility of an immediate recovery. The 80 % drop in the foreign trade balance in April, compared with the same month last year, cannot be significantly mitigated even by a drop in tourism abroad by the Germans: the current account balance in April fell by almost two thirds compared with the previous year.

The huge surplus demand from abroad, which the Germans have been "needing" for many years now to dispose of their production - in 2019 it exceeded 7 % of GDP - and to keep their economic model based on wage dumping afloat, will be extremely negative throughout the coronavirus crisis. The structural distortion towards exports of our prod

DW - Can Germany defend its strategic interests?

This is the question posed by Deutsche Welle, a public online newspaper that has always been very close to the positions of the Berlin government after the latest clashes between Germans and Americans. In Berlin they are openly hoping for a defeat of Trump in the November elections, and they are doing everything to facilitate it, knowing that if the current president were to be confirmed, the level of the clash would rise again and Berlin could not pursue its strategic interests. From Deutche Welle, a radio and television broadcaster and public online newspaper.

Can Germany have its own interests and pursue them? Washington's answer seems to be clear: only with the blessing of the American government! It threatens sanctions for European companies involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, already 96 % complete. Let us remember that the pipeline will transport natural gas from Russia to Germany and from there to other EU countries at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, bypassing all other states.

Germany makes a living from exports. Its industry needs energy security. That is why industry and the federal government are supporting the construction of the pipeline. But Washington is also trying to channel into its policy all those reservations about this project that come from other countries - especially those from Poland and Ukraine.

An ambassador like an agitator

But none of this seems to have convinced the White House. President Trump is determined to stop this pipeline by any means possible. One of his agitators is Richard Grenell, the former US ambassador to Berlin. Meanwhile, the undiplomatic diplomat has made a significant contribution to bilateral relations: he resigned on 1 June and left Germany.

Another strong agitator against the pipeline is Ted Cruz, the far-right Republican senator from Texas. A man who some of his party comrades call "the incarnation of the devil". Others say if Cruz gets sick in Congress, no one would call the emergency room. Ted Cruz has been sponsored by the American fracking industry for years... who want to sell his gas in Europe. Their problem: American gas, which technically can only be produced at great cost, is more expensive than Russian gas. Washington - who would have thought of the former supporter of the free market economy? - prefers to evade the competition. It is much easier to wave the stick of sanctions. A policy Trump calls America first. But by doing so, he risks damaging relations with one of his most loyal allies.

Although I publicly praise Chancellor Merkel, both the media and government representatives continue to say that their talks are very tough. The Chancellor is probably of a different calibre than a Montenegrin head of government that the President of the United States simply pushes aside when he gets in the way or disturbs. With Merkel this is not possible. She is not intimidated. Which seems to bother Trump a lot.

Withdrawal of almost one-third of American soldiers...

And now he would like to punish you for your insubordination and withdraw almost 10,000 American soldiers from Germany by the end of the year. Most Germans don't even seem to be particularly affected, at least not until the country is exposed to an external military threat. After all, the noise and environmental pollution caused by American troops has been the subject of strong criticism for years. Only mayors and company leaders in the cities that house the American bases really fear a withdrawal of troops. But above all: the Americans are present in Germany because it is in their interest (all missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are controlled from there), and it is also in NATO's interest. If Trump were to withdraw an even larger contingent now, he would above all harm himself and drive the US further away from Europe.

The third one to enjoy will be China. Any conflict within the West reinforces Beijing's position vis-Ã -vis Washington. The way the Americans are behaving makes it difficult for them to count on the EU's help in their trade dispute with China. On the contrary. Berlin will take over the presidency of the EU Council in July. Chancellor Merkel continues to stick to her plan to hold a meeting of all EU heads of state and government with President Xi Jinping - even though the original date of mid-September has meanwhile been cancelled due to the Coronavirus pandemic. To hold such a meeting immediately before the US presidential elections would obviously have been a diplomatic provocation. Trump would not have been invited. And as an observer, he could only tweet.

Hoping for November 3rd

If its administration in November were to be rejected by the voters, relations between the United States and Germany would quickly return to normal. Democrat challenger Joe Biden simply understands that Germany has its own interests too, and can pursue them.

FAZ - Does Italy need a debt cut?

Restructuring or not restructuring Italian debt? Friedrich Heinemann of Zew in Mannheim, told the FAZ: "When the acute phase of the crisis is over in 2022, we will need an international conference on Italian public debt. And of course, the holders of the securities will have to play their part and partially waive their claims". Hans Werner Sinn also agrees that Italian government bond holders should pick up the bill for the crisis. Lars Feld, the German government advisor, on the other hand, is much more cautious and tends to rule out a cut in Italy's public debt. From the FAZ and Germany comes yet another pistolotto on the restructuring of Italian debt.

(...) The starting situation is therefore rather gloomy. The question now is: does Italy really need a debt cut to solve its problems?. In any case, such a step should no longer be considered taboo, recommends Hans-Werner Sinn, former president of the Ifo Institute in Munich. "As much as I am in favour of generous financial aid to Italy, it is unacceptable that Italian and foreign creditors are constantly being saved by European taxpayers instead of participating in the losses themselves," says the economist. Sinn refers to the "Paris Club", an informal club for international negotiations in which such debt cancellations are usually regulated. "There are proven rules for orderly debt restructuring". Since the Second World War onwards, Sinn argues, there have been about 180 debt restructurings. "And the world is not yet over." Even in the eurozone, a partial debt cut for Italy would be nothing new. In the case of Greece, in fact, a debt cut has already been made during the euro crisis of 2012, and it was one of the biggest in the history of finance. To these were added controls on capital movements. "I'm afraid that sooner or later we will have to use them in the case of Italy too, because the rescue packages won't last long," says Sinn.

And this is also the opinion of Friedrich Heinemann, public finance expert at the ZEW economic research institute in Mannheim: "the Reconstruction Fund will ultimately not be able to solve Italy's dramatic financial problems". The money to be mobilised for aid is enormous - but it will never be enough for Italy. Much more important for Italy, he says, is that the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to diligently subscribe to the new government bonds that the Finance Minister in Rome continues to issue on the markets. But ultimately, it will be European taxpayers who will be responsible for the growing risks to the ECB's balance sheet.

Like Hans-Werner Sinn, Heinemann believes that there is no way to avoid a cut in Italy's public debt. "The debt is too high, the country cannot get out of it," says the ZEW economist. "When the acute crisis is over in 2022, we will need an international conference on Italian public debt. And, of course, the holders of securities will have to do their part and give up some of their credits". Heinemann wants creditors to pick up the bill too.

But there are other experts who see things differently. "Italy doesn't need a debt cut," says Lars Feld. The economist from Freiburg chairs the Council of Economic Wise Men, whose task is to advise the federal government. In Greece, debt reduction was inevitable at the time, but this comparison is misleading, explains Feld: "Italy has a completely different economic consistency. If the Italian government finally tackled the necessary reforms with determination, considerable forces could be unleashed in terms of economic growth". He is counting on the country to get out of its current debt situation, as economic growth would be able to generate more tax revenue.

A debt cut, on the other hand, would probably do more harm than good, Feld points out: "Once the debts are paid off, the pressure to tackle the reforms needed for growth would also decrease. And this is the exact opposite of what Italy needs". Greece is a cautionary example: the debt cut of eight years ago has only temporarily reduced the country's debt ratio. In the absence of economic growth, it rose again very rapidly - and now it is even higher than before the debt cancellation.

In the case of Italy, Feld also considers a debt cut to be too risky. The main problem is that the largest creditors of the Italian state remain by far the Italian banks, which have huge amounts of government bonds and claims on state institutions on their balance sheets. In the middle of last year, Italian banks were creditors to the Italian state for a total of EURÂ 690Â billion. If these securities were to be written off as part of a restructuring of public debt, many banks would end up in difficulty.

"We would immediately have a banking crisis in Italy, which would spread to other European countries because of the close ties that have been created," says Feld. French banks, in particular, have high claims on Italy and would suffer massive losses. But it's not just the banks. Insurance companies, investment funds and other major investors are also creditors of the Italian state and would therefore be affected by debt restructuring.

Once again, that of Greece was a cautionary example: the restructuring of the country's debt in spring 2012 brought panic to the markets, at an already very critical stage. "Looking back, it has to be said that the cut accelerated the Eurocrisis fire," even Heinemann of ZEW, a supporter of a debt cut, admits. That is why he would not immediately convene the "international conference on Italian debt" that he recommended, but would only do so in the following year - and even then he would only put only part of the burden of restructuring on the creditors holding the bonds. "Now, in the middle of the economic crisis, you can't do that. The markets are too fragile for such a choice".

Hans-Werner Sinn does not deny the risk of a financial crisis associated with a debt cut, but believes that this risk is the lesser of the two evils. France is strong enough to support its banks in an emergency, he says. Ultimately, it's a matter of weighing the risks - and politicians lack foresight in this regard: "They are always afraid of short-term risks for the financial markets and in return accept risks that are much more threatening in the long term," Sinn criticizes. "The rescue of creditors by pooling debt erodes states and creates the danger of a huge debt war in Europe, which could bring down the EU.

But one thing must be clear: even if there were no new financial crisis in Europe, a cut in Italy's public debt would probably not be free for German taxpayers anyway. Because in recent years the ECB has bought mountains of Italian government bonds, and even the central bank would inevitably be hit by a debt cut. Germany would have to bear some of these losses. "The Bundesbank would then have to be recapitalized by the German state," says Sinn. In extreme cases, this could cost up to 150 billion euros.

What is the conclusion? The arguments of both sides can be summed up roughly as follows: a debt cut for a large country like Italy would be a radical relaunch, after ten years in which taxpayers have directly or indirectly incurred very high costs for bailouts in the eurozone. But the risks of this change of course would be considerable. And whether debt relief can really help Italy and the other euro countries in the long term is not at all certain. "There is no easy way out," says Hans-Werner Sinn. "We're really bogged down.

Der Spiegel - Bella Italia, here we come!

"My advice for the holidays 2020: go to Italy, enjoy the Italian lifestyle! But don't ask yourself who will pay the bill in the end. Because the pleasure of your holiday may suffer," writes Alexander Neubacher in Der Spiegel. Even for the so-called "quality press" the transfer union has already started and German taxpayers will have to pay the bill for the somewhat too relaxed Italian lifestyle. An ironic comment from Der Spiegel.

Italy has reopened its borders to tourists. And since in a few days the German government's foreign travel alert will also be lifted, there's nothing stopping you from taking a summer holiday in the country of the German Sehnsucht: beautiful Italy, hurray, here we come!

This year, however, travellers will have to make a special effort not to hurt the feelings of their hosts. Only a few weeks ago, in fact, in Coronavirus-ridden Italy, one had the impression that the Italian-German friendship was just a step away from breaking up due to Germanic avarice.

A Five Star Senator, a ruling party in Rome, said he had had enough of the "dictates of Hitler's grandchildren". Tens of thousands of Italians shared a video in which a well-known Italian actor accused the Germans of being "arrogant without mercy" who still consider themselves "a superior race". The Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, on the other hand, turned on the Germans by accusing them of being selfish and nationalistic after the Berlin government had sided against the Coronabonds.

It was fortunate for German tourists that Angela Merkel and French President Macron suddenly decided to support a 750 billion euro European aid programme. Most of the money, more than EURÂ 170Â billion, goes to Italy, 80Â billion of which should be non-repayable. What Italian could have ever believed that the Germans would be so generous?

The Dutch, along with the Austrians, Swedes and Danes, are still trying to stop that part of the non-repayable aid programme. One wonders where the Dutch will go on holiday this year.

As German tourists, what are the arguments to avoid in order not to ruin the delicate ties between Germany and Italy right away? My advice is: don't talk about everything to do with money. Here are some examples.

 - Italy is heavily in debt, but is it ready to spend another three billion euros of public money on Alitalia, even though, unlike Lufthansa, it has been losing money for years? Forget it!

- Will the car manufacturer Fiat Chrysler obtain a loan guaranteed by the State of EURÂ 6.3Â billion? Close your eyes and leave it alone!

- Has the Italian Ministry of Finance just issued - exclusively for large investors and Italian savers - a high-interest bond, which German savers can only dream of? Never mind, don't look petty.

If you are wondering why the average Italian family has higher assets than the German family, then do it quietly. And don't be jealous when you find out that your lower-income Italian co-holidayer should collect up to 500 euros in government-paid holidays, provided the money stays in Italy.

My advice for holiday 2020: go to Italy, enjoy the Italian lifestyle! But do not ask yourselves who will pay the bill in the end. Because the pleasure of your holiday could be affected.

What is behind the pro-European turn of the German Government?

This question is answered by Sven Giegold, economist, MEP and head of economics for the German Greens, interviewed by Eric Bonse, freelance journalist. In the interview, Giegold explains what is behind the recent Europeanist turn of the German government and why the Greens are trying to take the political authorship of Merkel's recent turn. From Lost in Europe

First the "Bazooka", and now "the momentum": almost all taboos have been broken in German financial policy. But Berlin has also moved in the right direction at European level, according to the Greens' economic and financial policy officer Sven Giegold. An interview.

Bonse: The EU Commission intends to finance a EUR 750 billion reconstruction programme in debt. Chancellor Angela Merkel has also spoken out in favour of an EU debt - even though she has always been strongly opposed to it until now. What does she think of this reversal?

Giegold: It is a 180 degree reversal of Germany's European policy. Incidentally, it is a late echo of last year's European elections. The voters then voted for more Europe. And now a whole series of false German taboos about Europe are in fact falling. It is hard to believe that Wolfgang Schäuble and Friedrich Merz have meanwhile also become in favour of a debt-financed European programme! It has been a success for us pro-Europeans.

Bonse: what taboos are you referring to?

Giegold: I am referring to European taxation, which could also be in the form of a European digital tax, non-refundable subsidies instead of loans and shared responsibility. The Christian Democrats and especially the CSU had never wanted a European tax before, and now suddenly there is a great openness on this issue. Germany, too, had never wanted transfers before, but now there will be EUR 500 billion in grants. And as far as debt is concerned, until recently, people in Berlin kept saying again and again: we will never make coronabonds, and under no circumstances! But now there are common bonds coming in times of coronavirus. And this strengthens Europe!

Bonse: but debt should remain an absolute exception, Merkel talks about a one-off special measure.

Giegold: all budgets are unique. The important thing is that we now have a completely different narrative in Germany. European cohesion needs a fiscal policy and common, solidarity-based investment in Europe. Only the FDP and AfD have not yet felt the blow...

Bonse: how do you explain this turning point?

Giegold: we do not know what the real reasons were. But I believe that the ruling of the German Constitutional Court on purchases of government bonds by the European Central Bank played an important role. I think that this ruling is questionable and dangerous for European law, but it has triggered a debate in Germany about the fact that we cannot leave it to the ECB to resolve all crises. Mr Voßkuhle perhaps deserves a bunch of flowers, after all he has done ...

Bonse: what role did French President Macron play? For years, after all, he has been trying to convince Merkel to adopt a different European policy, has he succeeded?

Giegold: it was a serious mistake on Merkel's part to have failed to respond to Macron's initiatives for so long. In the end Macron changed course and involved other countries - not only on coronabonds, but also on climate policy. In doing so, she put Merkel under pressure. But Italy probably made a big impression as well. The fact that during the crisis caused by the coronavirus support for the EU in Italy collapsed in Berlin triggered the alarm. And then, of course, GroKo also reads the opinion polls. And then it is clear to everyone that most Germans are not as stingy as one might think. Most understand that help is necessary.

Bonse: But there is also a downside to the aid: the EU will have to repay its debts until 2058, the EU budget for the coming years will be frozen, subsidies will be linked to economic policy conditions...

Giegold: debt repayment is spread over 38 years. It is so long that repayment will have no macroeconomic role. The fact that the EU's financial framework is not being increased is a concession made to the "Four frugal countries". But the EUR 750 billion for reconstruction actually means a higher EU budget. There could also be wrong sacrifices. For example, the Erasmus exchange programme may not be expanded. Parliament will have to fight on this issue.

Bonse: what about cross-compliance? The EU Commission wants to enforce them with the help of the 'European Semester', but this is a massive intervention in the budgetary powers of national parliaments, without democratic control!

Giegold: right, that is why it is now a question of parliamentarising the European Semester. It would be good if the European Semester were not just a bureaucratic exercise without any binding effect, as it has been until now. Many of the recommendations from Brussels have so far had too liberal an imprint. The recommendations will therefore now have to be adopted by Parliament. Otherwise there is a risk that investment priorities will be set without Parliament's approval.

Bonse: what about the European Green Deal? Many in the Greens, but also the Social Democrats and Linke are critical of the fact that the Brussels draft has been watered down.

Giegold: The danger is real, as only 25 % of the next EU budget will be explicitly earmarked for the fight against climate change. Climate protection must be the material to be used for economic reconstruction. Merkel and von der Leyen must do more for the climate if they want approval from the European Parliament. This is not only about the amount of subsidies, but also about the quality of spending. We have not yet reached the point.

Bonse: what about the thrifty Four and the other EU states? They have yet to give the go-ahead and could again water down the reconstruction fund and the Green new Deal.

Giegold: Austrian Chancellor Kurz is already giving the first signs in favour of a compromise. At least I interpret it that way when he talks about a debt union - because nobody has foreseen it! But even if Kurz were to get in the way: in the end Austria and the "frugal four" do not even reach 10% of the population. The big EU countries, Germany, France, Spain and Italy support the proposal. The fact that an agreement has been reached despite the renationalisation in the Coronavirus crisis is a big step forward.

Breitscheidplatz - "We don't know if Anis Amri was driving the truck."

This is not the usual plotting blog but a Member of the Bundestag who is a member of the parliamentary committee of inquiry into the terrorist attack on Breitscheidplatz in Berlin at the end of the investigation. Another great German mystery, piloted by the usual fake news spread by wise spin doctors, and probably destined to remain unsolved. It was quite difficult to believe the official version of the lone terrorist who, on a normal working day, in a normal industrial suburb of Berlin alone takes out a burly Polish driver and then drives his truck around the city undisturbed until the evening. A very interesting article from Heise.de

It is a sentence that sounds like a verdict, and expresses very strong doubts about the official version of the Breitscheidplatz bombing in Berlin: "We do not know if Anis Amri was driving. But according to the available evidence, there were other people in the truck". The Member of the Bundestag of the Greens Constantin von Notz said so at the last meeting of the committee of inquiry. The sentence was directed at a BKA investigating commissioner (Bundesskriminalamt) who could not explain many of the traces, but nevertheless stuck to the official version of Amri the lone bomber - as other BKA colleagues had done before and after him.

The work of the investigating committee leads to a question: Was Amri really the only man in the truck? "We don't know if Amri did it" doesn't mean "it wasn't Amri". But we are still very close to making that statement. Von Notz speaks rather of "Amri possible culprit". Definitely less than the formula "alleged guilty" and much less than the statement "Amri is guilty".

The urgency to reach the conclusion also includes a question: why did the central investigating authorities focus almost exclusively on the alleged lone murderer Anis Amri? The Tunisian at the time of the attack was undoubtedly in the vicinity of the crime scene. This is demonstrated by the video recording of 8:06 p.m. in the subway underpass at Bahnhof Zoo. And he was in possession of the murder weapon. He was probably part of a criminal group. But if he wasn't the driver, then someone else was behind the wheel of the bombing vehicle.

This also means that the bombing is open. The perpetrators and accomplices have yet to be found. Amri can be considered the first safe accomplice. There are more elements in favor of this scenario than the official version. Police investigators, as well as political investigators in the commissions of inquiry, have had to deal with other people connected to Amri - including the informants of the security authorities active in this environment. By focusing almost exclusively on Amri, however, much valuable time has been lost.

The case is also an example of how an entire apparatus can be manipulated and guided in a certain direction by simply giving a name - whether it is voluntary or not.

The statement: "we don't know whether Amri was driving the truck" among other things emerges from a rather dubious evidentiary pattern. What forensic evidence supports the hypothesis that Amri drove the truck, was responsible for the attack and shot the truck driver Lukasz Urban? How can we prove that the fugitive was driving the truck if his tracks are not found inside the truck? Was the glass dust also found on Amri's clothes, just like on Urban's clothes, which were in the truck? These are just some of the committee's questions, which the BKA criminologists cannot answer clearly.

On the contrary, the overall pattern of evidence makes it conceivable that there were other people on the truck.

Meanwhile, it is a fact that no prints of Anis Amri were found in the driver's cab of the truck. Not on the steering wheel, gear lever, dashboard or inside the driver's door, for example.

Only two fingerprints or Amri prints were found on the outside of the driver's door. One includes the palm, thumb and three fingers of the right hand. According to the BKA, the print was made "as if the door had been closed from the outside". How can you close a door from the outside and then sit in the cab? And how is it possible that Amri performed a "magic trick" (Konstantin von Notz), i.e. leaving his fingerprints on the driver's door, and then, assuming he stayed and moved on the truck for another 30 minutes, didn't even leave one inside? Have the investigators ignored all these contradictions just because they don't fit the Amri lone bomber theory?

"We have no evidence to rule out Amri as the killer."

The response of the BKA investigation coordinator, Chief Inspector A.Q., is tantamount to an oath: "We have no evidence to rule out Amri as the perpetrator. This statement prompts the Green MP to ask the rhetorical question: why does this tendentious interpretation of the traces that only and always lead to Anis Amri work so well? Von Notz at the same time also gives an answer: "Because the culprit is dead". If he had not died, he would have to prove his guilt in court, and with this evidence it would be quite difficult.

So no fingerprints from Amri in the truck - and where are we with DNA? The elements here are pretty thin, too. A mix of two people was found behind the wheel, but no full DNA profile was drawn. The part about the truck driver Urban dominates. The corresponding annotation in the report vaguely states that Amri is "to be considered" as the second person responsible for the DNA traces.

A mixed profile of three DNA traces was also found on the threatening piece of paper marked "HARDENBERGSTR B" (in capital letters), discovered in the truck cab only after three weeks. Hardenbergstraße is the entrance road to Breitscheidplatz. Once again the DNA of the truck driver Urban dominates, secondly is "must consider that of Amri", and in addition there is the DNA of an unknown third person.

Evidence is said to have been overlooked by the Criminal Police Task Force at the scene of the crime. That is, both during the first inspection on 30 December 2016 and during a second inspection by the BKA coordinators on 10 January 2017. Until then, the truck had been moved twice through the city. The note was in the dashboard in front of the speedometer display. Had it been overlooked by the police group that intervened at the original crime scene? It's hard to imagine. And the fact that it was deliberately ignored doesn't make much sense.

In fact, the man from BKA A.Q. cannot say whether the note was in the truck from the start and was overlooked, or whether "someone put it there". This means: a manipulation cannot be ruled out. Incidentally, it is only a piece of paper, the back is printed. Where it came from is not even clear.

Apart from the inexplicable DNA trace on the note, there are 13 other open DNA profiles, the BKA member told the committee. These 13 DNA traces were found in the truck driver's cab and "in front of the truck", by the way. It is unclear what is meant by "in front of the truck". Maybe the HTC cell phone. Another unknown DNA trace is a leather fragment on the headrest of the driver's seat.

If, in addition to unexplained traces of DNA, there are also untraceable fingerprints, this was not discussed in committee.

Strange photos

On Amri's HTC phone, strangely found in a hole in the truck's bodywork, there are two photos taken after the attack. Members of the Bundestag committee addressed the issue in the courtroom debate. 

The inexplicable discovery has been the subject of debate for weeks. In the meantime, the BKA has released an official technical explanation. In a letter to the committee it is stated: 'it can be ruled out that the image files were taken with Amri's HTC'. These would be image files from web pages that were automatically offered to the user on his device by a Google app in the form of preview images and stored in a cache file. The BKA had also identified the web addresses from which the 2 images were displayed. However, no direct link was found between the images and the web page, but "probably this is only available on the side of Google's servers", the document reads. However, the BKA assumes that the pictures can be assigned to the corresponding websites.

Unanswered questions about the crime truck

Essential questions were also raised about the vehicle used in the attack, the 40-tonne Scania truck. It had reached its maximum weight as it loaded steel beams and had a mass greater than that of the truck from the Nice bombing, which on 14 July 2016 had caused over 80 deaths. Did Amri know the truck was loaded? - asked Volker Ullrich (CSU), member of the commission. Was it a coincidence - or did someone deliberately choose this truck because it had a heavy load? Did anyone in Italy know the truck was going to Germany? Who loaded it? Was the choice of the murder weapon perhaps already made in Italy?

Questions to which even the BKA cannot answer, but which lead to the Italian scene of the terrorist attack in Berlin and the end of Amri's escape in Sesto San Giovanni near Milan. There, near where he died, the truck that later became the vehicle of the attack of December 16, 2016, at the last loading place had picked up a package.

What skills does a person who wants to drive such a heavy, long and cumbersome vehicle need? Especially at night, in the rush hour traffic of a big city. We don't even know if Amri had a driver's license to drive the car. Once the informant "Murat" had driven him from North Rhine-Westphalia to Berlin as a driver. But Amri's landlord, Kamel A, was a professional truck driver.

The truck enters the Christmas market at about 50 km/h, then within a distance of 70 - 80 meters it is braked until it stops, as would have happened in a serious car accident. Yet shouldn't the driver have left a trace? Sweat, blood, hair, skin flakes. And the accident left no marks on him? Injuries, abrasions, contusions, blood. With or without seat belt. Were there any corresponding marks on Amri's body? That's also unclear.

No confidant, supporter or accomplice?

The number of people, possible accomplices, who were in the vicinity of the crime scene at the time of the crime continues to increase: in addition to Amri's roommate, Khaled A., his confidant Ben Ammar, Walid S. or the brothers Ahmad and Bilel M., the commission discovered that Feysel H. could also have been in Breitscheidplatz shortly after the crime. Amri probably met Feysel H. at the Fussilet mosque an hour before the attack. As the board found out, so did Ahmad M., who then left the mosque minutes before Amri. That means three to four people have already been identified at the meeting place.

The BKA has identified a total of over 300 possible contacts for Amri in Germany. 43 have been classified as "potentially relevant to the crime". These include, in particular, the Berlin environment, including the radical mosque in Fussilet. In Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia, a series of telephone interceptions and inspections of apartments were carried out. In Dortmund, Amri had also used an apartment which, curiously enough, is located in Mallinckrodtstraße, near the NSU crime scene.

In no case are there any confidants, supporters or accomplices, not "relevant to the crime". At least in Ben Ammar's case, however, there was a well-founded suspicion of complicity. However, he was expelled, as happened to half a dozen of Amri's other contacts expelled after him. The suspects were either ignored or depotentiated - whether it was the presence at the scene of the attenatum or the DNA on the murder weapon.

His circle of people consisted of violent jihadists, drug dealers and organized crime, but they were not strictly separated from each other; on the contrary, they overlapped and mingled. The best example was the physical confrontation in July 2016 between Amri's accomplices and other Arabs in a bar of the Abou Chaker clan. Ahmad M., who was with Amri in the Fussilet mosque on the night of the attack, incidentally used the pseudonym "Ahmad Abou-Chaker".

Unknown identity of informants

The BKA representative, Kriminalhauptkommissar (KHK) D.G., responsible for investigating whistleblowers, shrugged his shoulders when asked if there were BKA sources in Amri's circle. Were there any reports from sources that provided information? Same way: no recollections.

It is known that the BKA in Berlin had at least two informants in the environment.

The Security Department of the LKA (Landeskriminalamt) in Berlin, which immediately took over the investigation on 19 December 2016, quickly became convinced that the Breitscheidplatz event was an Islamist attack. He immediately compiled a list of 40 people on Berlin classified as possible perpetrators and who were searched at home or in mosques from 23.00 onwards. Most of these searches, however, were not carried out immediately.

The other committee of inquiry, that of the Berlin House of Representatives, did not know who it was. But the name Anis Amri was not among those 40, explained Stefan Redlich, who at the time was in charge of the mobile task forces (MEK) and research groups that carried out these checks. About half of the suspects had been cleared when Amri's name became known on the afternoon of December 20, 2016. Checks on the people were interrupted and only the fugitive was subsequently sought. Amri's confidant, Ben Ammar, went into hiding for ten days. To date, investigators are still unable to say where he was.